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You Say Fiduciary, I Say Binary: A Review and
Recommendation of Robo-Advisors and the
Fiduciary and Best Interest Standards
Sophia Duffy, JD, CPA and
Steve Parrish, JD, RICP©, CLU©, Chfc©, RHU©
ABSTRACT
Automated investment advice platforms, also known as “roboadvisors”, are investment advice tools that have quickly grown in popularity
over the last decade. These sophisticated software platforms allow
individuals to receive low-cost financial advice about various financial
planning goals, such as creating or adjusting investment portfolios,
retirement planning, education funding, and the like, simply by entering asset
and demographic information into an online platform. The robo-advisors
automatically generate the financial advice based on the data inputs with
little to no involvement from a human financial advisor. The allure of these
low-cost, easily accessible robo-advisors has captured a large segment of the
consumer market. As robo-advisors grow, the regulatory outlook for
investment advisors is changing. The scope of fiduciary duty is
encompassing more and more areas of financial advice. In addition, a
newcomer onto the liability field, known as the “best interest” standard, has
elevated the liability standard for broker-dealers to a fiduciary-like status.
This has created a contrast between automated, generic advice and the
regulatory push towards personalized, fiduciary advice. In this paper, we
determine whether robo-advisors are able to meet the liability standards set
 Sophia Duffy is the Associate Dean of Academics and Assistant Professor of Business
Planning at the American College Financial Services. Holding both a JD and CPA, Sophia
focuses on the intersection of accounting and law. Previously, Sophia has written about the
potential liability involved in the widespread adoption of autonomous vehicles.
 Stephen Parrish currently serves as the Director of the New York Life Center for Retirement
Income at The American College of Financial Service. Parrish also serves as a faculty
member at Drake University, where he is the Interim Program Director of the Compliance
and Risk Management program. Previously, Parrish owned his own insurance company and
served as Vice-President of the Principal Financial Group. In addtion to his academic and
private sector work, Parrish often serves as an expert witness on complex insurance and estate
planning matters.

[3]

2 - DUFFY_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

4

12/2/2020 12:43 PM

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

forth by regulators and recommend the ways in which robo-advisors can best
serve consumers.
We first discuss the fiduciary and best interest standards for investment
advisors in depth by reviewing statutory language, whitepapers and guidance
issued by various regulating bodies, and thought leadership put forth by
industry experts. Next, we evaluate whether robo-advisors are able to meet
these standards by reviewing guidance from regulatory agencies and
commentary from thought leaders, peer-reviewed articles, and regulators.
We find that robo-advisors can meet the fiduciary standard when providing
limited-scope investment advice, and can meet the best-interest standard in
most cases. However, robo-advisors may not rise to a fiduciary level when
providing broad, comprehensive financial advice, such as preparation of an
estate plan, retirement plan, or overall wealth management. In our
conclusion, we propose a clarification of regulatory language to 1)
recommend the specific services for which robo-advisors are best or bettersuited compared to human investment advisors, and 2) prohibit roboadvisors from performing services for which they are ill-suited.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, robo-advisors, or automated systems for
providing financial advice and services, are becoming more and more
popular.1 According to research conducted by Business Insider Intelligence,
experts estimate that robo-advising platforms will manage $1 trillion in
assets in 2020, and $4.6 trillion in assets by 2022.2 This is setting up an
interesting challenge in the practice of financial advice. Historically,
financial advice was provided by human advisors3 who used automated
systems as a supplementary tool. For example, a human advisor would
commonly use software to generate an ideal investment portfolio allocation
for a client based on their spending goals, lifestyle, and retirement time
horizon. In recent years, these automated tools have become highly
sophisticated, so much so that some services can be provided entirely by the
1. Marguerita Cheng, The Future of Wealthtech, FORBES, (Feb. 19, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/margueritacheng/2019/02/19/the-future-of-wealthtech/#33741
49c35e6 (There are currently over 200 robo-advising platforms registered in the United
States).
2. Sarah Kocianski, The Evolution of Robo-Advising: How Automated Investment
Products are Disrupting and Enhancing the Wealth Management Industry, BUSINESS INSIDER,
(July 3, 2017, 10:31 AM); https://www.businessinsider.com/the-evolution-of-robo-advisingreport-2017-7?IR=T.
3. The term “advisor” is used interchangeably with “adviser.” Though the SEC prefers
to use “-er”, the more common industry usage is “-or”. We will use the “-or” ending for
consistency in this paper.
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software without any human involvement. We will refer to these systems as
“pure robo-advisors” in this paper (as opposed to a hybrid robo-advisor
model, which would involve some human interaction). A challenge this
advancement in technology represents is how to regulate financial services
when some or all of the advice derives from a computer. While technology
enables automated advisor services to be more widely accessible, the
regulatory landscape seems to be requiring more personalized advisor-client
relationships (which are more costly than less personalized advice).
Numerous federal and state authorities, as well as industry regulatory bodies,
have enacted or proposed regulations and standards to raise the level of
liability for financial professionals providing different types of advisory
services so that more of these professionals are held to a fiduciary or
fiduciary-like standard.4
This contrast between automated advice and the regulatory trend
towards human-centered advice spurs two questions: First, what legal
standard applies to robo-advisors? Second, what types of advisory services
can a robo-advisor provide while still meeting the applicable legal standard?
In this paper, we first look at the general regulatory environment for financial
service professionals, recognizing that much of the law contemplates that the
advisor is assumed to be human. We then consider where pure robo-advising
platforms can best fit within this regulatory framework. Our conclusion will
be that pure robo-advice works best in a limited scope client engagement
such as investment advice and monitoring. Lastly, we propose changes to
the regulatory statutes that would enable robo-advisors to meet the
applicable standard most effectively and clarify how robo-advisors should
be utilized to provide financial advice.
A note is in order concerning the terminology to be used in describing
the person, firm or computer providing advice to the client. The term
“advisor” and “adviser” have historically had both identical and differing
definitions, depending on the statute or regulation involved.5 And, as will be
4. New York, California, New Jersey, Maine, and other states have proposed new
fiduciary standards ranging from a comprehensive standard for all financial professionals to
fiduciary liability when providing advice in specific situations. See Kevin L. Walsh and
David N. Levine, A New Litigation Saga Begins for Another Best Interest Rule,
INVESTMENTNEWS, Sept. 10, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20190910/BLOG09/190919995/a-new-litigation-saga-begins-for-another-best-interest-rule;
see also The CFP Board will implement a fiduciary standard for all Certified Financial
Professional designation holders in 2019; see also Directors of CFP Board Set Enforcement
Date for New Code and Standards, CFP Board, (July 16, 2019), https://www.cfp.net/newsevents/latest-news/2019/07/16/directors-of-cfp-board-set-enforcement-date-for-new-’codeand-standards’.
5. Michael Kitces, Financial Adviser vs. Advisor: What’s the Difference?, NERD’S EYE
VIEW, (Aug 18, 2016), https://www.kitces.com/blog/financial-adviser-vs-advisor-vs-finan

2 - DUFFY_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

6

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

12/2/2020 12:43 PM

[Vol. 17:1

discussed below, with the SEC a current distinction exists between whether
the provider of advice can be called an “advisor” or “broker”. For this paper,
we are focused on financial advice, in whatever form it is provided.
Consequently, and to make the analysis clearer, we will use the general term
“advisor” to indicate an entity (human or robo) which is providing financial
information and services to a client.
THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE FOR FINANCIAL
PROFESSIONALS
The regulation of financial advisors began long before the presence of
computers. In fact, the landscape of federal regulations regarding the
liability of financial professionals has been evolving for almost a century,
beginning in 1934 with the enactment of the Securities and Exchange Act.6
In recent years, the pace of regulatory change has kicked into high gear. This
regulatory acceleration is largely spurred by the growing retirement crisis
and highly publicized ethical failures in the financial sector, such as the
Madoff Ponzi scheme and the 2007-2008 mortgage crisis that triggered a
U.S. recession and wreaked havoc among global financial markets.7
Governmental agencies have increasingly pushed for more regulations to
protect consumers of financial services from bad actors in the financial
profession who recommended poor, and financially devastating, investments
simply to earn higher income or receive other benefits. Note that most of this
regulatory activity has been focused on human-based advisors.
A history of recent regulatory activity shows mixed results in achieving
this outcome. While those financial professionals commonly deemed
financial “advisors” have long been held to a fiduciary standard,8 the
cial-planner-whats-the-difference/ (It’s worth noting in terms of registering as an investment
adviser, and being subject to the legal standards of an investment adviser, it doesn’t actually
matter whether you call yourself advisor with an O-R or adviser with an E-R.)
6. Mark Schoeff, Jr., A Historical Timeline of Fiduciary Duty for Financial Advice,
INVESTMENTNEWS, (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.investmentnews.com/historical-timelineof-fiduciary-duty-for-financial-advice-66755.
7. “In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Congress recognized the need to ensure that
retail investors can readily access unbiased advice from all financial professionals, regardless
of whether that advice comes from an investment adviser or broker-dealer.” See Attorneys
General of New York, California, Connecticut, et al., Comments to Proposed Best Interest
Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission, (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-07-18/s70718-4185784-172673.pdf.
8. The Investment Advisors Act of 1940 requires individuals who provide investment
advice for compensation to refrain from fraud, deceptive practices, or material misstatements
and omissions of information. See Investment Advisor Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 206 (1940);
Although the term “fiduciary” is not explicit in the statute, it was first used to define the
standard in the seminal case regarding advisor liability, SEC v. Capital Gains Research
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Labor
(DOL) recently attempted, but were ultimately unable, to enact a
comprehensive fiduciary standard for all financial professionals.9 The
fiduciary standard is a highly protective standard of liability for services that
require an agent (in this context, the financial professional), to act in the best
interests of a principal (the client).10 After the federal efforts to impose a
uniform fiduciary standard failed, many states and other regulating bodies
have opted to take action on their own.11 These regulations aim to heighten
the liability standard for any financial services professionals who provide
advice, including those that are not defined as “advisors” under the 1940 Act.
For example, under these attempts, those selling a life insurance policy,12

Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963). (“The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects
a congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory
relationship”), and again in Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 97, U.S. 1292, 1295 (1977); see
also Megan Ji, Note, Are Robots Good Fiduciaries? Regulating Robo-Advisors Under the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 117 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1543, 1548 (2018); see also Lorna
A. Schnase, An Investment Adviser’s Fiduciary Duty, The Fiduciary Institute, 7 (Aug. 1 2010),
https://www.thefiduciaryinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/lornaschnaseFiduciary-D
uty-Paper.pdf.
9. In 2016, the Department of Labor proposed regulations that would require all
financial professionals working with retirement plans or providing advice related to retirement
to act as fiduciaries towards the plan participants. After vocal opposition by industry groups,
numerous delays, and a change in the Presidency to a less regulatory-friendly regime, the
“DOL fiduciary rule” was vacated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2018. The court
vacated the proposed regulation on several grounds, including an unreasonable and arbitrary
and capricious exercise of administrative power by the DOL, DOL regulatory overreach, and
inconsistency with established regulations. See Chamber of Commerce of the USA, et al., v.
Department of Labor, et al., 17-10238 F.3d 360, 363, 384-385 (5th Cir. App. Ct. 1976); see
also Melanie Waddell 5th Circuit Issues Order to Kill DOL Fiduciary Rule, THINK ADVISOR,
(June 21, 2018, 12:54 PM), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2018/06/21/5th-circuit-ordersdol-fiduciary-rule-vacated/?slreturn=20191116123828.
10. The Investment Advisors Act of 1940 requires individuals who provide investment
advice for compensation to refrain from fraud, deceptive practices, or material misstatements
and omissions of information. See 15 U.S.C. § 206. Although the term “fiduciary” is not
explicit in the statute, it was first used to define the standard in the seminal case regarding
advisor liability. See Capital Gains Research, 375 U.S. at 191. And again in Santa Fe
Industries, 430 U.S. at 1295; see also Ji, supra note 7, at 1549.
11. See Walsh, supra note 4; see also The CFP Board will implement a fiduciary
standard for all Certified Financial Professional designation holders in 2019; see also
Directors of CFP Board Set Enforcement Date for New Code and Standards, CFP Board,
(July 16, 2019), https://www.cfp.net/news-events/latest-news/2019/07/16/directors-of-cfpboard-set-enforcement-date-for-new-’code-and-standards’.
12. See New York Superintendent of Financial Services, First Amendment to 11
NYCRR 224 (July 17, 2018), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/docs/insurance/r_finala/2018/rf1
87a1txt.pdf (proposes to hold individuals selling or providing advice related to life insurance
policies to a best interest standard that is similar to a fiduciary standard).
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advising or working with retirement plans,13 individuals holding the CFP®
mark,14 and most notably, broker-dealers who perform transactions on behalf
of a client,15 are or will be held to a fiduciary or a similar “best interest”
standard.
The result of these myriad efforts is an ever-evolving and complicated
jumble of regulations that is difficult for the average financial professional
to understand. Regulators have acknowledged this fact and have stated that
the various regulating bodies should work together to clarify and streamline
the liability standards.16 Though this area continues to change at a rapid pace,
a trend has clearly emerged towards increasing liability to a fiduciary-like
standard for all financial professionals providing advice to individual
consumers. Two main categories of liability have evolved under these
regulations: a broadened traditional fiduciary standard, and a new bestinterest standard.
In this section, we provide a summary to highlight the complexity
caused by the volume of regulations that cover this area, but we will focus
more heavily on the fiduciary standard for three reasons: 1) the fiduciary
standard applies most broadly to those providing comprehensive financial
advice to individual clients, 2) the best interest standard is similar to the
fiduciary standard in many ways so we will only highlight the primary
differences; and 3) the regulation of robo-advisors, discussed later in this
paper, will most likely fall under the fiduciary standard.

13. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employee Benefits and Security Admin., Meeting Your
Fiduciary Responsibilities (Sept. 2017), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/aboutebsa/our-activities/resource-center/publications/meeting-your-fiduciary-responsibilities.pdf.
(Any individual making recommendations to an employer-sponsored retirement plan and
charging a fee is a fiduciary under the ERISA regulation.).
14. See, Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Directors of CFP Board Set
Enforcement Date for New Code and Standards, CFP Board (July 16, 2019), https://www.
cfp.net/news-events/latest-news/2019/07/16/directors-of-cfp-board-set-enforcement-date-fo
r-new-’code-and-standards’ (The CFP Board will implement a fiduciary standard for all
Certified Financial Professional designation holders in 2019.).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 202(a)(11)(c) 1940 (Historically, broker-dealers were not defined as
advisors under the 1940 Act as long as they only provided advice “tangential” to performing
some transaction on behalf of a client. “… any broker or dealer whose performance of such
services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who
receives no special compensation therefor” is not an advisor.).
16. See, Tobias Salinger, How Firms and Regulators Are Preparing for Reg BI’s
‘Significant Impact’, FINANCIAL PLANNING (Sept. 10 2019, 1:19 PM), https://www.financialplanning.com/news/how-finra-sec-nasaa-are-implementing-reg-bi; see also, Mark Schoeff
Jr., FINRA Will Defer to SEC on Interpreting Best Interest Rule, INVESTMENTNEWS (Sep. 9
2019, 4:17 PM), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20190909/FREE/190909946/fin
ra-will-defer-to-sec-on-interpreting-best-interest-rule.
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FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR INVESTMENT ADVISORS
Financial advisors, defined as individuals who provide financial advice
for a fee, have been held to a fiduciary standard since the passage of the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940.17 When this law was enacted, there were
no computers, and naturally the law assumed it was addressing “individuals”
who provide financial advice. Over the years, countless interpretations and
refinements of the fiduciary standard by courts and regulatory bodies have
resulted in a fairly well-established body of law regarding what specific
duties constitute a financial advisor’s fiduciary duty.18 Most authorities
agree that fiduciary duty is comprised of, at minimum, a duty of care and a
duty of loyalty.19
DUTY OF CARE
The duty of care requires the financial advisor to provide
prudent recommendations to a client that:
are based on appropriate and diligent research regarding the
investments recommended and client’s personal circumstances and
goals;
align with the client’s level of financial sophistication;
are appropriately and reasonably priced;
follow customary and normal professional practices, and

17. See, 15 U.S.C. § 202(a)(11)(c) 1940 (The Investment Advisors Act of 1940 requires
individuals who provide investment advice for compensation to refrain from fraud, deceptive
practices, or material misstatements and omissions of information.); see also, Capital Gains
Research, 375 U.S. at 282-83 (1963) (“The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a
congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory
relationship”); see also, Santa Fe Industries, 97 S. Ct. at 1295 (1977); Accord, Megan Jo, Are
Robots Good Fiduciaries? Regulating Investment Advisors Under the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1543, 1549 (2018).
18. See generally, Megan Jo, Are Robots Good Fiduciaries? Regulating Investment
Advisors Under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1543, 1549-1551
(2018) (for an in-depth analysis on the history of fiduciary interpretations regarding financial
advisors).
19. See, SEC, Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment
Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 276, 2 (2019) https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf; see
also Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, Definition of Fiduciary Duty,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fiduciary_duty (last visited Oct. 21, 2020); see also 37 Am.
Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 35 (2020) (“Where a confidential or fiduciary relationship exists,
it is the duty of the person in whom the confidence is reposed to exercise the utmost good
faith in the transaction with due regard to the interests of the one reposing confidence…(a)
fiduciary duty is a duty of loyalty.”).
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include ongoing monitoring of client accounts as appropriate
within the scope of the client relationship.20
Regarding the first two factors noted above, the duty of care includes
doing reasonable inquiry into the client’s circumstances and objectives, so
that the advisor can formulate appropriate advice in the client’s best
interest.21 The advisor also needs to make a determination regarding how
financially sophisticated the client is, and whether the client can truly
understand the recommendations being made.22 The SEC, when providing
guidance regarding interpretation of the duty of care, commented that this
reasonable inquiry would include
“whether the adviser is aware of events that have occurred that could
render inaccurate or incomplete the investment profile on which the
adviser currently bases its advice. For instance, in the case of a financial
plan where the investment adviser also provides advice on an ongoing
basis, a change in the relevant tax law or knowledge that the client has
retired or experienced a change in marital status could trigger an
obligation to make a new inquiry.”23
The critical phrase in the SEC’s interpretation is whether the advisor “is aware
of” important information which may impact the client.24 This indicates that the
duty of care would seem to include not only a responsibility to gather information
from the client, but to act upon any other information the advisor possesses which
may be relevant, such as a new tax regulation that would impact the client, or if the
advisor notices something about the client that the client would not have otherwise
shared. For example, if an advisor notices a client has lost weight, appears unwell,
and exhibits other signs of sickness, the advisor may inquire about the client’s health.
Upon learning that the client has been diagnosed with a severe illness, the advisor
should recommend the client update their medical documents, any powers of
attorney, healthcare directives, and review their estate plan. Or, upon simply asking
“How are the kids?” the advisor may learn that the client’s son has been battling
addiction, which may lead the advisor to recommend removing the son from a joint
account to limit his access to cash.

20. Id. at 12-21; see also, Lorna A. Schnase, An Investment Adviser’s Fiduciary Duty,
The Fiduciary Institute, 7 (Aug. 1, 2010), https://www.thefiduciaryinstitute.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/02/lornaschnaseFiduciary-Duty-Paper.pdf.
21. See SEC, Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment
Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 276, 12-21 (2019) https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf.
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf.
22. See Schnase, supra note 7, at 7.
23. See SEC, supra note 18, at 14.
24. See SEC, supra note 18, at 14.
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While failure to make small talk may not constitute a breach of fiduciary
duty,25 many experts in the fiduciary space agree that this ability to use judgement,
pick up on contextual clues, and ask probing questions is critical to satisfy the
fiduciary duty.26 Clearly, an advisor is most effective as a fiduciary when he or she
acts upon information gathered through formal and informal means, such as the
advisor’s intuition or personal experience with the client.27 For example, attorneys,
who also hold fiduciary status, are required to act if they notice signs of cognitive
decline in their elderly or ailing clients.28 While financial advisors are not required
to do the same, the passage of statutory protections for advisors who choose to act
to protect clients upon seeing a client’s cognitive decline, such as the Senior Safe
Act and FINRA regulations, indicate that public policy favors advisors who act upon
their reasonably-based intuition.29 As we discuss later, with the advent of roboadvising, one must question whether the current state of technology allows a
computer to fulfill these kinds of duties to clients.
The SEC has also clarified that the duty of care requires the advisor to “provide
advice and monitoring at a frequency that is in the best interest of the client, taking
into account the scope of the agreed relationship.” 30 The SEC provided an example
of an advisor compensated via a periodic asset-based fee, and stated this relationship
would require the advisor to provide extensive monitoring and advising.31
Conversely, the SEC clarified that in a limited relationship, “such as for the
provision of a one-time financial plan for a one-time fee”,32 the advisor would not
likely have any ongoing monitoring responsibilities.33 From this interpretation, we

25. Under current regulatory standards, an advisor is not required to nor considered
capable of assessing mental capacity for a client, even if signs of declining mental capacity
are clear, although defrauding or otherwise taking advantage of a mentally diminished client
is a clear breach of fiduciary duty. See Schnase, supra note 7, at 15–16.
26. See Ji, supra note 7, at 1567.
27. Interestingly, while an advisor has no duty to act proactively if they see a client
exhibiting signs of cognitive decline, many firms train advisors to spot and act upon the signs.
See Schnase supra, note 7, at 16. Attorneys, on the other hand, are required to report or follow
up on signs of mental decline in their clients. This “exercise of judgment, even if it is merely
the incipient awareness that [‘]something is not right,[‘] is itself an assessment.” See also AM.
BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON LAW & AGING & AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ASSESSMENT OF OLDER
ADULTS WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 1 (2005).
28. Attorneys are required to look for signs of mental decline in their clients for two
reasons: to determine whether clients have legal capacity to enter into a contract for services
with the attorney, and to determine whether the client has capacity to complete the legal
transactions that the representation may require. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON LAW &
AGING & AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, supra note 26.
29. Press Release, Sec. & Exch., SEC, NASAA, and FINRA Issue Senior Safe Act Fact
Sheet to Help Promote Greater Reporting of Suspected Senior Financial Exploitation (May
23, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-75.
30. See SEC, supra note 18, at 20–21.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 20-21.
33. See id. at 20-21.
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can establish that an advisor’s fiduciary duty can be broad or limited, depending on
the scope of the agreement. A broad fiduciary duty would relate to more
comprehensive and ongoing services, while a limited scope relationship would likely
be applicable to a one-time service, or service related to specific portfolio or
investment.
In the next section, we note that to the extent the financial plan is confined to
the development and recommendation of an investment portfolio (i.e., a limited
scope engagement), we believe that a robo-advisor is capable of fulfilling this
fiduciary duty of care. Further, if there is an expectation of on-going investment
monitoring, we also believe that robo-advisors are not only capable of fulfilling this
fiduciary duty, but in some respects even better than the human advisor in doing so.
DUTY OF LOYALTY
The other primary duty under an advisor’s fiduciary standard is the duty of
loyalty.34 The duty of loyalty requires an advisor to act in the best interest of the
client by seeking out the best outcome, refraining from any self-dealing or creating
any conflicts of interest that may harm the client, and to disclose any material and
relevant information to the client.35
To satisfy the duty of loyalty, an advisor must:
act in the client’s best interests;
place the client’s interests above the advisor’s own interests; and

avoid or mitigate conflicts of interest.36

The third factor, avoiding conflicts of interest, is an oft-litigated issue and is
the one we will focus on in this discussion. Some conflicts are clear, while others
fall into a gray-area and the advisor must make a judgement call as to what actions
are required to satisfy the fiduciary duty. If an advisor cannot or chooses not to
avoid a conflict of interest, the advisor may obtain the client’s informed consent to
continue with the conflicted action in most cases, after providing “full and frank”
disclosure about the conflict.37 However, the law is clear that an advisor cannot
bypass fiduciary responsibility by simply obtaining the client’s consent for all
conflicts, rather, an advisor must eliminate or mitigate conflicts if they are not able
to be adequately disclosed.38 Conflicted actions may include charging clients for
broker research that the advisor then utilizes for other clients, recommending
investment in mutual funds managed by the advisor (which would result in the

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See id. at 2.
See id. at 21-29.
See id.
See Schnase, supra note 7, at 11-12.
See SEC, supra note 18, at 28.
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advisor receiving two fees from the client – the client’s advisory fee and fees charged
by the mutual fund), and investing in the same securities as an advisor’s clients.39
When we start applying the standard of loyalty to the world of the roboadvisor, it is arguable that a properly programmed robo-advisor may actually be
better at avoiding some conflicts of interest than the human advisor. As we discuss
below, greed, avarice, and personal bias are human characteristics that can
potentially be deprogrammed from a robo-advice platform. In addition, detecting
conflicts of interest is possibly more straightforward and easier on a robo-advice
platform, compared to a human advisor.
THE EXPANSION OF FIDUCIARY LIABILITY
Historically, financial professionals who did not meet the definition of an
advisor under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940 were not held to a fiduciary
standard.40 Rather, registered representatives who were not advisors (e,g., brokers
working for a broker-dealer), were subject to a lesser “suitability” standard. 41
Financial professionals who were not under the purview of securities law were held
to a similar suitability standard or some other non-fiduciary standard.42 In recent
years, federal regulators have taken measures to protect the public from all sources
of low quality or harmful financial advice by advocating for a broader fiduciary
standard that would include more individuals who provide financial advice.43
However, these efforts have been met with vocal and powerful opposition from
lobbying organizations, industry investment, and advisory giants.44 In 2015, the
Department of Labor proposed a fiduciary standard for all financial professionals
within its purview, including broker-dealers.45 The regulation was effectively killed
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2018 for being overbroad and beyond the
DOL’s mandate.46
There are, however, many states and other regulatory bodies that have taken
up the cause in the wake of the DOL’s defeat, and they have enacted or proposed
regulations to impose a fiduciary standard across many more areas of financial
39. See Schnase, supra note 7, at 11-12.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 202(a)(11)(c), See Schoeff, supra note 5.
41. See, SEC, Commission Interpretation Regarding the Solely Incidental Prong of the
Broker-Dealer Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Advisor, 17 C.F.R. § 276 (2019),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5249.pdf (FINRA is the primary regulatory body
for anyone trading public securities, and has instituted a separate liability standard, commonly
known as the Suitability Standard, for broker-dealers trading securities but who do not meet
the definition of an advisor under the 1940 Act). See also Schoeff, supra note 5.
42. See id.
43. See supra note 40.
44. See Schoeff, supra note 5.
45. See id.
46. Christopher Robbins, 5th Circuit Closes Book On Fiduciary Rule, FINANCIAL
ADVISOR MAGAZINE, (June 21, 2018), https://www.fa-mag.com/news/5th-circuit-decisionsignals-end-of-dol-fiduciary-rule-39369.html.
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practice.47 Further, even though the DOL failed to expand the reach of its coverage
to areas such as rollover IRAs, the law regarding employer-sponsored retirement
plans, commonly known as ERISA, still requires all individuals providing
investment advice to an employer-funded retirement plan to adhere to a fiduciary
standard.48 And in 2019, the CFP Board caused tsunami-sized waves in the industry
with the announcement of an impending fiduciary standard for any individual
holding a CFP designation.49 Recently, six states, with Massachusetts leading the
charge, have announced plans to impose fiduciary liability for all financial
professionals providing advice, including broker-dealers.50 Other states, like New
Jersey, are also proposing expanded coverage of the fiduciary rule.51 And other
regulatory agencies, such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (a federal
watchdog agency created during the Obama administration), have made similar
noises towards a uniform fiduciary standard.52

EMERGENCE OF A NEW BEST INTEREST STANDARD
47. See supra note 10; see also supra note 13; see also SECRETARY OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Preliminary Solicitation of Public Comments:
Fiduciary Conduct Standard for Broker-Dealers, Agents, Investment Advisers, and
Investment Adviser Representatives (June 14, 2019), https://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctfiduc
iaryconductstandard/fiduciaryconductstandardidx.htm.
48. See Meeting Your Fiduciary Responsibilities, supra note 12.
49. See supra note 13; see also Driving Public Policy, Our Priorities, CFP BOARD
https://www.cfp.net/public-policy/public-policy-issues/fiduciary-standard. Like the DOL
proposed regulation, this rule has fierce opposition, and its effective date has been delayed by
over 1 year from the originally proposed date as the CFP Board and industry groups work
together and clarify the regulations. Melanie Wadell, FPA Calls for CFP Board to Delay
Enforcement of New Ethics Standards, THINKADVISOR, (July 9, 2019, 3:21 PM)
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2019/07/09/fpa-calls-for-cfp-board-to-delay-enforcement-ofnew-ethics-standards/; Andrew Welsch, Will Edward Jones Stop Advisors From Using the
CFP Designation, ONWALLSTREET, (June 3, 2019, 4:15 PM), https://onwallstreet.financialplanning.com/news/will-edward-jones-stop-advisors-from-using-the-cfp-designation.
50. Bruce Kelly, Morgan Stanley Threatens to Pull Out of Nevada Over State’s
Fiduciary Rule, INVESTMENTNEWS, (Mar. 13, 4:44 PM), https://www.investmentnews.com/
article/20190313/FREE/190319968/morgan-stanley-threatens-to-pull-out-of-nevada-over-st
ates-fiduciary; see also SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Preliminary
Solicitation of Public Comments: Fiduciary Conduct Standard for Broker-Dealers, Agents,
Investment Advisers, and Investment Adviser Representatives (June 14, 2019), https://
www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctfiduciaryconductstandard/fiduciaryconductstandardidx.htm.
51. N.J. DIV. OF CONSUMER AFF., 51 N.J.R. 493(a), Volume 51, Issue 8, (proposed Apr.
15, 2019), https://www.njconsumeraffairs.gov/Proposals/Pages/bos-04152019-proposal.aspx
(last visited on Oct. 21, 2020).
52. Lorie Konish, With Major Financial Protections on Hold, Here’s How You Can
Guard Your Investments, CNBC, (Jan. 6, 2019 11:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/
04/with-consumer-protections-in-limbo-heres-how-you-can-guard-your-investments.html.
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However, we cannot ignore that the large financial institutions and lobbying
organizations have had some success in blocking fiduciary progress. For nearly a
decade, they were able to delay action on Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act. This
provision directed the SEC to study the need for establishing a uniform federal
fiduciary standard of care for brokers and investment advisers providing
personalized investment advice.53 Further, it is these organizations that led the legal
fight against, and ultimately killed, the original attempt to impose a uniform
fiduciary standard on financial representatives by the DOL.54 In an attempt to
compromise with these opponents while still moving the needle towards a higher
standard, some regulatory bodies have taken the path of “less” resistance by
instituting what is now known as “best interest” regulations.55 These regulations
require some groups of financial professionals to act in the client’s best interest,
among other requirements.56 The use of the term “best interest” as something
separate from a fiduciary standard has caused confusion in the industry, since the
fiduciary standard has been known to mean “serving in the client’s best interest”, or
simply, the “best interest standard.”57 Rather than adopting a uniform federal
fiduciary standard of care for brokers and investment advisers as suggested in the
Dodd-Frank legislation, a best interest standard that covers broker-dealers was
adopted by the SEC in June of 2019 and is now commonly referred to as Regulation
Best Interest (“Reg BI”).58 Reg BI imposes the best interest standard on all

53. See generally Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84
Fed. Reg. 33,318, 33,329-30 (July 12, 2019) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (“The
Commission is adopting Regulation Best Interest pursuant to the express and broad grant of
rulemaking authority in Section 913(f) of the Dodd-Frank Act.”).
54. Mark Schoeff, Jr., A Historical Timeline of Fiduciary Duty for Financial Advice,
InvestmentNews, (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.investmentnews.com/historical-timeline-offiduciary-duty-for-financial-advice-66755.; see also Bruce Kelly, Morgan Stanley Threatens
to Pull Out of Nevada Over State’s Fiduciary Rule, INVESTMENTNEWS, (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20190313/FREE/190319968/morgan-stanley-thre
atens-to-pull-out-of-nevada-over-states-fiduciary.
55. See Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg.
33,318; see also New York Superintendent of Financial Services, First Amendment to 11
NYCRR 224 (July 17, 2018), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/docs/insurance/r_finala/2018/rf187a1
txt.pdf (Proposes to hold individuals selling or providing advice related to life insurance
policies to a best interest standard that is similar to a fiduciary standard.).
56. See Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg.
33,318; see also First Amendment to 11 NYCRR 224, supra note 53.
57. See Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment
Advisers, 84 Red. Reg. 33669 (June 5, 2019) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 276).
58. Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg.
33,318; see also Bradley Berman, Anna T. Pinedo, and Michael D. Russo, Regulation Best
Interest, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation,
(June 19, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/19/regulation-best-interest/.
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registered representatives and broker-dealers providing investment advice, even
those providing solely incidental advice.59
Interestingly, the SEC defines exactly what processes and actions constitute
meeting the best interest standard.60 While the SEC stopped short of labeling Reg
BI a fiduciary standard, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton specified that Reg BI purposely
drew from fiduciary principles, such as the duty to disclose material information,
eliminate or mitigate conflicts, and make recommendations in the client’s best
interest.61 Reg BI is more prescriptive than the fiduciary standard in that it explicitly
outlines four requirements that must be complied with in order to satisfy the
standard.62 Significantly, Reg BI does not require elimination of all conflicts of
interest, but only requires written policies and procedures “reasonably designed to
identify and at minimum disclose or eliminate conflicts of interest” (emphasis
added).63
Other regulatory agencies have jumped on the best interest bandwagon. The
state of New York recently passed the “Suitability and Best Interests in Life
Insurance and Annuity Transactions” regulation, otherwise known as “Reg 187.”64
Reg 187 requires individuals making recommendations regarding the sale of or
transactions related to life insurance policies or annuities to act in the consumer’s

59. Id.
60. James Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Regulation Best Interest and The Investment
Adviser Fiduciary Duty: Two Strong Standards That Protect and Provide Choice for Main
Street Investors, (July 8, 2019) (Reg BI requires satisfaction of four requirements: disclosure,
care, conflict of interest, and compliance.)
61. Id. (Reg. BI imposes a best interest standard upon broker-dealers that is higher than
the current suitability standard, and draws from fiduciary principles which require the brokerdealer to act in the best interests of their clients.).
62. Hester M. Pierce, Commissioner, SEC, What’s in a Name? Regulation Best Interest
v. Fiduciary, (July 24, 2018) (“[T]he best interest obligation shall be satisfied if: (i) the brokerdealer reasonably discloses to the retail customer … the material facts relating to the scope
and terms of the relationship with the retail customer and all material conflicts of interest that
are associated with the recommendation; (ii) the broker-dealer, in making the
recommendation, exercises reasonable diligence, care, skill, and prudence; (iii) the brokerdealer establishes, maintains, and enforces written policies and procedures reasonably
designed to identify and at a minimum disclose, or eliminate, all material conflicts of interest
that are associated with such recommendations; and (iv) the broker-dealer establishes,
maintains, and enforces written policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and
disclose and mitigate, or eliminate, material conflicts of interest arising from financial
incentives associated with such recommendations.”).
63. Id. (Under Reg BI, the broker-dealer must establish, maintains, and enforce “written
policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and disclose and mitigate, or
eliminate, material conflicts of interest arising from financial incentives associated with such
recommendations.”), (citing proposed rule 15l-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(17 CFR 240.15L-1) (emphasis added).
64. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 224 (2019).
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best interest.65 Like Reg BI, Reg 187 is very prescriptive in setting forth
requirements for meeting this standard.66 Further, Reg 187 also sounds very much
like a fiduciary standard by requiring the individual making the recommendation to
act in the client’s best interests, act with due care, ensure the recommendation is
suitable, and ensure the client is aware of any conflicts of interest.67
As we noted earlier, the term “best interest” is routinely used at common law
to describe the fiduciary requirements of loyalty and fairness. To imply in the
regulatory world that “best interest” and “fiduciary” aren’t commonly understood to
be the same standard creates confusion for the parties subject to the regulation, and
will create difficulty for courts to interpret these terms differently. This begs the
question – are the two standards really that different? When addressing the best
interest vs. fiduciary issue, SEC Commissioner Hester Pierce downplays the tension
created by the terms’ similarity68 and instead encourages financial professionals and
clients to focus on the substance of the services rendered to determine whether the
best interest standard has been met.69 Although Commissioner Pierce glosses over
the weight of the terms used, she is one of the few individuals who has ventured to
clarify how the best interest and fiduciary standards actually differ. She notes that
there are two substantive differences between the two standards – first, the fiduciary
standard requires the fiduciary to provide ongoing and continuous advice as
appropriate, while the best interest standard may only apply to circumstances at a
point in time; and second, the best interest standards have slightly different
restrictions regarding conflicts of interest.70 While this is helpful commentary, this
distinction lacks real substance. As we noted earlier, the fiduciary duty to
continuously monitor client accounts can be limited by reducing the scope of the
engagement.71 While the best interest standards are more prescriptive regarding
conflicts of interest, the final Reg BI wording clearly states that the regulation aims

65. Id.; see also Peter Molinaro, Esq., REGULATION 187 NEW YORK’S BEST INTEREST
STANDARD, NAIFA-NYS (2019), https://naifanys.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Power
PointReg187.pdf.
66. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, §§ 224-226 (2019); see also Peter Molinaro,
Esq., REGULATION 187 NEW YORK’S BEST INTEREST STANDARD, NAIFA-NYS (2019), https://
naifanys.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/PowerPointReg187.pdf.
67. Id.
68. H Pierce, supra note 60.
69. Id. (“We—as regulators—and you—as advisers and brokers—ought to make an
effort to encourage investors to look beyond nice terms to the substance of what their financial
professional is doing . . . .”).
70. Id. (“[O]nly two differences stand out. First, an adviser generally has an ongoing
duty to monitor over the course of its relationship with its client, while a broker-dealer
generally does not. Second, a broker-dealer must either mitigate or eliminate any material
financial conflict of interest it may have with its client.”).
71. See Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. IA-5325 (July 12, 2019), https://
www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf.
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to identify and “disclose OR eliminate” conflicts.72 The ultimate result is the same
as the fiduciary standard, which allows an advisor to continue with a conflict as long
as it is properly disclosed to a client.73 Reg BI appears to be, simply, the fiduciary
standard in a convenient checklist format. We all know the phrase “if it looks like a
duck, walks like a duck, and sounds like a duck, then it’s probably a duck.” While
the best interest standard may not be the same species as a fiduciary duck, it is
certainly within the same genus.
The parsing of words such as “best interest” and “fiduciary” are not just
interesting issues that may or may not come up in future litigation. These issues are
applicable now because they can often overlap. Consider this example. A New
York representative of a financial service company is licensed as a life insurance
agent and as a registered representative of her company’s broker-dealer. She has
earned her CFP designation as well. Say she sells a client a variable annuity. What
is required of her to fulfill her regulatory duties under these new rules? New York’s
new Reg. 187 subjects her and her insurance company to a best interest standard,
and she is expected to provide certain documentation under this regulation. The
variable annuity is a security and consequently, she is also subject to the SEC’s new
Reg BI. Although both of these regulations require her to act in her client’s best
interest, they use different methodologies and have different expectations for how
she must demonstrate compliance. Further, in one case, her insurance company must
take certain actions to assure her compliance, but because the product is a security,
her broker-dealer is also expected to have specific procedures. And, what about her
requirements as a CFP? To maintain her designation, she is to be measured as a
fiduciary. Assume something goes wrong with the sale, and her client wants to file
a complaint. Is the representative’s actions to be measured by the best interest
standards of two different regulators plus the fiduciary standard of a disciplinary
board? If a civil suit comes from the alleged wrong, will she be judged by the highest
of the three different standards? Or will she be subjected to yet a fourth standard –
New York’s common law concerning insurance agents? While there is no easy
answer, this example shows that the issues are front and center.
This review of the fiduciary and best interest regulations shows that the overarching strategy for regulators is to include more and more of the financial services
landscape under a fiduciary-type umbrella. But how does this increase in fiduciary
responsibility apply when the advisor is binary rather than DNA-based? In the next
section, we discuss whether a pure robo-advisor can meet this standard.

72. See supra note 60. (Under Reg BI, the broker-dealer must establish, maintains, and
enforce “written policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and disclose and
mitigate, or eliminate, material conflicts of interest arising from financial incentives
associated with such recommendations.”), (citing proposed rule 15l-1 under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (17 CFR 240.15L-1) (emphasis added).
73. See SEC Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment
Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 276.2.C (2019).
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ROBO-ADVISORS AND LIABILITY STANDARDS
In recent years, robo-advisors have exploded in popularity. The Aite Group
estimates that assets on digital investment management platforms was around US
$257 billion at the end of 2018, and that client assets under management on roboadvice platforms will reach US $1.26 trillion by 2023.74 This is largely because
robo-advised services are typically offered at a lower cost compared to a human
advisor, making advisor services more accessible to a broader population.75 In
addition, robo-advisors are arguably more effective than human advisors at some
services, such as continual monitoring and rebalancing of client accounts.76 This
model theoretically frees up human advisors to focus on more financially complex
client services, which require a stronger advisor-client relationship and specialized
attention.77 As financial advising technology evolves alongside an evolving liability
landscape, we must consider how and if pure robo-advisors can meet the applicable
liability standard. In this section, we first discuss what liability standard would apply
to robo-advisors, then whether robo-advisors can meet this standard.
CAN A ROBO-ADVISOR MEET THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD?
As we discussed in Section II, advisors covered under the Investment Advisor
Act of 1940 are held to a fiduciary standard. There is much regulatory and judicial
support for defining robo-advisors as advisors under the Act, and therefore to hold
them to a fiduciary standard. The definitive answer came from the SEC, who
determined that robo-advisors meeting the definition of an advisor under the
Investment Advisor Act of 1940 are considered registered investment advisers
(RIAs).78 Therefore, the SEC holds these robo-advisors to a fiduciary standard, as

74. Alois Pirker, US Digital Investment Management Market Monitor, Q2 2019, Report
Summary, Aite Group, (May 22, 2019), https://www.aitegroup.com/report/us-digital-invest
ment-management-market-monitor-q2-2019.
75. See Cheng, supra note 1. (“Because artificial intelligence replaces human
intervention almost entirely, costs for these kinds of services are reduced to a minimum. This
has opened the door to the world of investment for people that can’t afford a financial advisor
made of flesh and bones—the key to the success of robo-advisors, especially in the United
States.”).
76. Barbara Friedberg, What Robo-Advisors Can Do Better (and Worse) than Financial
Advisors, The Balance, (June 25, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/what-robo-advisors-dobetter-than-financial-advisors-4154903.
77. See Cheng, supra note 1. (“Still … (w)hat seems to remain a very important success
factor in the financial advisory business is personalization. People have emotions and
insecurities that need to be addressed, a quality that no machine can yet provide.”).
78. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, (Feb. 23,
2017) https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_robo-advisers.html. (“Although
the services that they provide are automated, robo-advisers in the U.S. must comply with the
securities laws applicable to SEC or state-registered investment advisers.”).
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are all other RIAs.79 The SEC has published additional guidance specifically for
robo-advisors that may assist them in meeting this fiduciary standard.80 This
guidance focused heavily on the development and testing of the algorithms that
power the robo-advisor.81 In addition, though sparse, case law and rulings support
holding robo-advisors to a fiduciary standard.82
Although it’s clear that robo-advisors can be held to a fiduciary standard,
whether or not a “pure” robo-advisor (that is, one that lacks any human advising
component) can actually meet the standard requires more analysis. This analysis
will suggest that pure robo-advisors are indeed capable of being fiduciaries when
they are being engaged for limited services such as the creation and monitoring of
an investment portfolio. When the service involves broad scale on-going financial
planning, the ability of a pure robo-advisor to successfully act as a fiduciary is more
questionable. We will begin by discussing the duties of care and loyalty in a pure
robo-advising context.
DUTY OF CARE
Recall that the duty of care requires the advisor to make prudent
recommendations based on the client’s needs, goals, and appropriate research, and
requires the advisor to provide ongoing monitoring within the scope of the client
agreement.83 Significant debate centers around the robo-advisor’s ability to meet
the prudent recommendation requirement. In the following sections, we discuss the
ability of robo-advice in meeting the prudent recommendation requirement in more
depth.
First, we discuss the deficiencies of the robo-advisor questionnaire and the
inability of the robo-advisor to proactively seek out information. Next, we discuss
the inability of the robo-advisor to utilize human judgement. Finally, we address the
arguments that highlight how a robo-advisor can meet the fiduciary standard, in
many ways exceeding the abilities of a human advisor.

79. The SEC has successfully litigated against 2 robo-advisors for violating the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940. See SEC Charges Two Robo-Advisors With False
Disclosures, Securities and Exchange Commission, (Dec. 21, 2018) https://www.sec.
gov/news/press-release/2018-300.
80. Guidance Update, DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION at 1 (Feb. 2017), https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance2017-02.pdf.
81. Id. at 3-4.
82. Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Annuity Fund; AXA Rosenberg Group, LLC, S.E.C.
No. 3-14224 (2011).
83. See supra note 18, at 10-20.
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Robo-Advisors Cannot Make Prudent Recommendations Because the
Questionnaire is too Limited
The insufficiency of the questionnaire the robo-advisor uses to gather
information about the client and formulate a recommendation is at the core of the
robo-advisor’s inability to meet the duty of care. First, there is no generally accepted
standard for these questionnaires. Second, many robo-questionnaires are too limited
in scope and do not allow the client to ask questions, which results in incomplete
information upon which the robo-advisor builds the investment recommendations
and an inability. Third, the advice recommended by the robo-advisor is not
personalized to each individual client.
Robo-Advice Questionnaires May Not Be Effective
Questionnaires vary widely in terms of length, question type, question topic,
and the like.84 While some questionnaires inquire broadly about the client’s personal
circumstances, risk tolerance, and investment horizon, others may ask questions that
are more limited and based on a certain outcome.85 In a Joint Investor Alert on
Automated Advice issued by the SEC and FINRA, the agencies cautioned that
questions on the survey can be “over-generalized, ambiguous, [or] misleading[.]”86
There is no consistency or industry-wide best practice to differentiate a good
questionnaire from a poorly constructed one. In addition, the robo-advisor has no
way of confirming through supporting documentation if the information provided is
accurate,87 and may not be programmed to spot inconsistent answers and ask the
client clarifying questions.88 Simply stated, the challenge with questionnaires is the
old adage “garbage in; garbage out.”
Robo-Advice is Based on Limited Data
Since the data is limited only to the specific questions asked, the universe of
information upon which the robo-advisor generates recommendations is quite
limited. If questionnaires fail to gather sufficient or accurate information, there is a
high likelihood that the advice provided will not meet the duty of care. Vital
84. FINRA, Report on Digital Investment Advice at 8 (Mar. 2016), https://www.
finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf; see also Investor Bulletin:
Robo-Advisers, supra note 76, at 6.
85. Guidance Update, supra note 78, at 6.
86. Investor Alert: Automated Investment Tools, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION (May 8, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/autolistingto
olshtm.html.
87. Mass. Sec. Div., Policy Statement, Robo-Advisers and State Investment Adviser
Registration at 5 (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctpdf/Policy-Statement—
Robo-Advisers-and-State-Investment-Adviser-Registration.pdf.
88. Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers,
supra note 18, at 6-7.
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information can be easily missed.89 In addition, the robo-advisor cannot seek out
information that exists outside of the questionnaire, and this prevents the roboadvisor from obtaining crucial information about the client. While a human advisor
can ask follow up questions, probe deeper into a topic if necessary, or ask for
background information and context, many questionnaires do not seek out
supplementary information or allow a client to provide more detail.90 Sometimes in
the course of doing a financial plan, the planner may unearth a new question whose
answer is impactful on the ultimate recommendation. Law Professor Arthur Laby
also notes that humans cannot share anticipated events with the robo-advisor.91 This
inability to proactively seek out or act upon more information is a major roadblock
to providing truly prudent advice.92
A related aspect to the limitations of the questionnaire is that the questionnaires
do not allow the client to ask questions, and the robo-advisor cannot discern whether
the client understands the questions being asked or what is being recommended.93
One industry expert, Scott MacKillop, wrote
Then there is the problem of properly identifying a client’s goals.
What if a client isn’t really sure about her goals or has a problem
articulating her goals? What if a client has multiple goals? What if the
client has conflicting goals? What if there’s a gap between an investor’s
tolerance for risk and the amount of risk he needs to take to reach his goal?
What if the investor simply doesn’t understand some of the 10 or 15
questions on the questionnaire? What if they think they understand the
questions, but really don’t? 94
If a client cannot ask questions, they may not understand what is being asked,
and they are more likely to respond incorrectly, which will lead to lower quality or
improper advice, thus failing the prudent recommendation requirement.
Robo-Advisors Cannot Make Personalized Recommendations
Many experts argue robo-advisors cannot make prudent recommendations
because they are designed to generate advice based on a pre-determined customer

89. Ji, supra note 7, at 1543.
90. Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers,
supra note 18, at 6.
91. Tara Siegel Bernard, The Pros and Cons of Using a Robot As An Investment Adviser,
N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/30/your-money/the-prosand-cons-of-using-a-robot-as-an-investment-adviser.html.
92. Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers,
supra note 18, at 6.
93. Id.
94. Scott MacKillop, Can A Robot Be A Fiduciary?, THINKADVISOR (Jan. 30, 2017, 7:00
PM), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2017/01/30/can-a-robot-be-a-fiduciary/.
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profile that is determined by answers to a limited questionnaire.95 When clients
respond to the questionnaires on a robo-advisor platform, the robo-advisor assigns
the client a pre-determined profile which should reflect the client’s appetite for risk,
goals, investment preferences, etc. Advice is then generated that should presumably
match the client’s profile characteristics. In FINRA’s Report on Digital Investment
Advice, it noted:
Many of these tools match investors to a pre-packaged portfolio of
securities based on their profile, i.e., investors with a conservative profile
are placed in a conservative investment portfolio and investors with an
aggressive profile are placed in an aggressive portfolio.96
However, in a study conducted by FINRA, they found that robo-advisors only
have an average of five to eight different customer profiles into which they
categorize thousands of clients.97 It is hard to imagine that these limited profiles are
truly representative of each client’s individualized needs and goals, which is not
aligned with the prudent recommendation standard to consider each client’s
individual circumstances.98 In fact, the word “fiduciary” was interpreted by the
Supreme Court into the Investment Advisor Act of 1940 specifically because the
court recognized that investment advice should be “personalized” and because of the
highly personal nature of the advisor-client relationship.99 A robo-advisor, however,
is simply not designed to deliver personal advice.
Robo-Advisors Cannot Make Prudent Recommendations Because They Lack
Human Judgement
Another argument raised by many experts against a robo-advisor’s ability to
make prudent recommendations is the absence of human judgment. This is a tricky
argument because there is no explicit regulation or judicial interpretation that
requires an advisor to utilize human judgment to satisfy fiduciary duty.100 However,
many experts in this space argue that human judgment is critical because it allows
95. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, (Feb.
23, 2017) https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_robo-advisers.html (“A roboadviser uses information you provide to create a recommendation. As a result, a roboadviser’s recommendation is limited by the information it requests and receives from you,
typically through an online questionnaire. It is important to keep in mind that some roboadvisers may obtain and consider only limited information about you.”); see also Guidance
Update, supra note 78, at 6.
96. Report on Digital Investment Advice, supra note 82, at 6.
97. Id.
98. See Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers,
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 13-14 (July 12, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/
rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf.
99. Capital Gains Research, 375 U.S. at 191 (1963).
100. Ji, supra note 7, at 1570.
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advisors to gather more information about a client that is critical to make prudent
recommendations. Compare scenarios where a couple uses a robo-advisor compared
to a human advisor to set up a brokerage investment account with both spouses on
the account. The human advisor may notice that the wife seems uncomfortable or
angry during the meeting. The human advisor may probe deeper to uncover the
source of this discomfort and may learn that the husband has significant creditor
issues and a gambling problem. The advisor can then advise how to protect the
assets in the account from the husband’s creditors, which is clearly in both spouse’s
best interests. A robo-advisor would not have picked up on those cues. It is clear
that human judgment is a valuable tool for an advisor to act in their clients’ best
interests.
As we noted, statutory authority does not explicitly require human judgment
to meet the fiduciary standard. Perhaps the reason is as simple as former SEC
Commissioner Kara M. Stein stated, “the concept [of robo-advisors] did not even
exist when most of the laws applicable to investment advisers were drafted. Most
of these laws are based on the idea of a human investment adviser on the other end
of the phone or sitting across the table from you.”101 Human judgment was not
explicitly written into the duty of care because it was assumed that humans would
always be the advisor, and using human judgment is a natural human trait that did
not need to be specified.
When Can a Robo-Advisor Make Prudent Recommendations?
Robo-advisor proponents have responded to these concerns about a
robo-advisor’s ability to meet the prudent recommendation standard with many
effective arguments. These proponents argue robo-advisors can make prudent
recommendations in limited scope engagements and could even surpass the abilities
of a human advisor. In a white paper issued by Morgan-Lewis, their experts draw
from trustee fiduciary principles to argue that robo-advisors can satisfy the duty of
care, as long as the engagement is limited in scope.102 In a limited engagement, a
much more effective questionnaire can be crafted which addresses all relevant data,
and therefore the robo-advisor can effectively make prudent recommendations.103
In addition, limited scope engagements are extremely popular and are a commonly

101. Kara M. Stein, SEC Commissioner, Surfing the Wave: Technology, Innovation, and
Competition - Remarks at Harvard Law School’s Fidelity Guest Lecture Series (Nov. 9,
2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/surfing-wave-technology-innovation-and-competit
ion-remarks-harvard-law-schools-fidelity.
102. Jennifer L. Klass & Eric Perelman, The Evolution of Advice: Digital Investment
Advisers as Fiduciaries, MORGAN LEWIS at 6-8 (2016), https://www.morganlewis.com//media/files/publication/report/im-the-evolution-of-advice-digital-investment-advisers-asfiduciaries-october-2016.ashx?la=en&hash=7A28D9586FD8ACADC9731733BFE4281F4
E6FEB49.
103. Id. at 2, 6-8, 16.
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accepted practice. 104 However, Morgan-Lewis ignores that these limited
engagements are typically based upon the client’s needs and desires; they are not
designed as a workaround to circumvent the deficiencies of the advisor. In addition,
some experts take issue with this approach as a panacea to the fiduciary issue and
argue that this scope limitation undermines the true intent of a fiduciary standard.105
Scott MacKillop argues that
Being a fiduciary comes along with important obligations and duties to the
client. You cannot maintain that you are a fiduciary while disclaiming all the
responsibilities that go along with that title.106
The Morgan Lewis experts remained silent regarding whether a robo-advisor
could meet the standard in a broader, comprehensive advising context. 107 In general,
however, it appears that robo-advisors are quite capable of fulfilling fiduciary
responsibilities in situations where there is a limited scope engagement.
An additional argument is that a robo-advisor may be more effective at making
prudent recommendations than a human advisor. The most glaring benefit of a roboadvisor is the sophistication of the machine’s ability to evaluate limitless data and
risk scenarios to develop an ideal efficient frontier investment portfolio. In days of
yore, before the use of computers for financial analysis, financial advisors would
manually develop these portfolio calculations, which were naturally based on less
robust data and prone to human error. The advancement of computer technology
has allowed for increasingly faster processing of calculations. In the area of
investment portfolio design this has allowed for more effective modeling, and
computers can outperform humans in this area at a quantum scale. Before
computers, Monte Carlo simulations required a significant amount of time and were
functionally unavailable for individual portfolio design. With the advent of the PC
and faster processing chips, stochastic modelling is a normal aspect of investment
portfolio design. Thus, with a carefully crafted fact finder that dives deeply into the
transaction defined by the limited engagement, a robo-advisor can create a more
informed investment portfolio than a human advisor.
In addition, recall that “(f)iduciary duty requires the advisor to update
information periodically so that [their advice] can be adjusted to changing
circumstances.”108 A robo-advisor could theoretically be programmed to gather data
from a potentially unlimited number of sources: global markets, regulatory changes,
industry news related to the client’s business, the local economy, even news about
the client’s competitors, and instantly make adjustments to the client’s portfolio or
identify areas of risk. It is unlikely a human advisor would have the time or
capability to keep abreast of all of these data sources. In this way, a robo-advisor
104. Id. at 7-8.
105. See MacKillop, supra note 92.
106. Id.
107. See Klass, supra note 100.
108. Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers; Custodial
Account Statements for Certain Advisory Clients, 59 Fed. Reg 13, 465 (proposed Mar. 22,
1994) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
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can satisfy the ongoing monitoring requirement much more effectively and cheaply
than a human advisor. While a human can only monitor an account periodically, a
robo-advisor can continually monitor and adjust an account to maximize
effectiveness. There is little risk that a robo-advisor, unless improperly
programmed,109 will miss an opportunity to rebalance, take advantage of a tax loss
harvesting opportunity, or adjust investments in a timely manner.
DUTY OF LOYALTY
As we noted earlier, the duty of loyalty requires an advisor to act in the client’s
best interests, place the client’s interests above the advisor’s own interests, and avoid
or mitigate conflicts of interest through “full and fair” disclosure of material
information and to avoid misleading clients. 110 Robo-advisors can satisfy the duty
of loyalty to a greater degree in some ways, such as eliminating advisor conflicts of
interest, and ensuring sufficient disclosures are provided. But significant issues
remain with regards to firm-level conflicts of interest and effectiveness of
disclosures. In fact, the technological complexity of robo-advisors may cause these
issues to be exacerbated and have a greater negative impact on the client population.
Robo-Advisors are Not Necessarily Free from Conflicts of Interest
Much of the support for robo-advisors comes from the idea that because roboadvisors are not susceptible to human biases or motivations, conflicts of interest can
be eliminated.111 While this may be correct, it only addresses the conflicts that arise
directly between the advisor and the client. Conflicts at the firm-level, which are
conflicts that arise due to the institution’s practices, policies, or procedures, are not
eliminated with the use of robo-advisors. In fact, robo-advisors can be, and often
are, intentionally programmed to favor the institution by making recommendations
that favor the institution’s products, rebalance client portfolios in ways which will
allow the institution to earn more fees, and otherwise make recommendations that
benefit the firm.112
For example, Schwab’s robo-advisor, SIP, was programmed to allocate
between seven and thirty percent of every client’s portfolio into cash, which was
then invested by Schwab. Schwab earned significant revenue through this practice,
but this was clearly not in the best interests of the clients, because while Schwab
paid the client nominal interest on the cash deposits, the cash could have been
invested more effectively and could have yielded much higher returns for the
109. SEC Charges Two Robo-Advisors With False Disclosures, SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-300.
110. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Commission Interpretation Regarding
Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 276, 12-21 (2019), https://
www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf.
111. See Ji, supra note 7, at 1572.
112. See id. at 1572-73.
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client.113 Schwab was forced to amend this practice so that the client is treated more
favorably, however practices like these are commonplace among all advisory
firms.114 And now, with the Schwab’s acquisition of TD Ameritrade, a new issue
arises with their robo platform. It has been suggested that he migration of TD
Ameritrade digital advice clients into the Schwab fold would amount to a conflict of
interest.115 In fact, the impact of firm conflicts like the one above are arguably more
detrimental than personal conflicts between an advisor and client because the
number of clients impacted by the firm conflict is potentially exponentially higher.
There is a counter argument to this challenge. While conflicts can occur within
a robo-advisor environment, these conflicts of interest are more readily detected
because the conflict of interest in a robo-advisor originates from inappropriate
program design. Whether innocently or nefariously created, the conflict is “hard
wired” into the robo-advisor’s recommendation. To the extent this violates the
fiduciary duty of loyalty, it violates it for all clients in the same circumstances. Once
discovered, it can be exposed and stopped. Robo-advising doesn’t prevent negligent
or fraudulent design, but it makes it easier to detect.
Robo-Advisor Disclosures Are Potentially Too Complex for Consumers to
Understand
A second issue to discuss regarding robo-advisors meeting the duty of loyalty
is the disclosure requirement. As we noted above, advisors must disclose any
information that is material or that denotes a conflict of interest. In some ways, roboadvisors can provide disclosures more effectively than human advisors. Roboadvisor disclosures will always be consistent and complete. There is no risk that a
robo-advisor will “forget” or intentionally fail to disclose an important fact, or that
some clients will receive a different explanation of the disclosures than others. In
fact, a robo-advisor can even utilize technology to emphasize specific information
in the disclosures, such as putting some information in pop-up boxes, requiring the
client to click “I Agree”, or highlighting critical text.116
However, the effectiveness of a robo-advisor in providing disclosures is
limited in two ways. First, there is no opportunity for the client to ask follow up
questions, or no opportunity for the robo-advisor to discern if the client truly
understands the disclosures through facial expressions or context.117 Although the
SEC explicitly states that an advisor is not required to ensure a client understands
the disclosures, it does clarify that “it would not be consistent with an adviser’s
fiduciary duty to infer or accept client consent where the adviser was aware, or
113. See id. at 1575.
114. See id. at 1575-76.
115. Samuel Steinberger, A Curious Consequence of Robo Integration,
WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.wealthmanagement.com/techn
ology/curious-consequence-robo-integration.
116. Guidance Update, supra note 78, at 5-6.
117. Id.
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reasonably should have been aware, that the client did not understand the nature and
import of the conflict.”118 The robo-advisor would be unable to rephrase or better
explain the information when a client fails to understand the disclosure. Second, as
we noted above, firm conflicts arise from a robo-advisor’s programming. While best
practices, regulatory guidance, and case law all require disclosures to be prominent,
easy to read and understand, and written in plain language,119 the complexity of a
disclosure increases significantly when technology is implicated. One scholar notes
…[S]ubstantial, and substantially complex, information that is
pushed out to consumers via disclosure is not accompanied by any test to
determine whether it is understood or appropriately used. Roboadvisers
add an additional level of complexity to disclosure as a device.”120
In addition to the normal and traditional disclosures, the SEC’s guidance for
robo-advisors, focuses heavily on the algorithms used to power the robo-advising
platform.121 The SEC recommends describing the algorithm’s design, how it will be
used, and what risks are posed by the algorithm’s design.122 The SEC requires that,
in cases where conflicts are so complex that they cannot be disclosed clearly and
specifically enough for a client to truly understand a conflict, the conflict should be
either eliminated or “adequately mitigate(d), (i.e., modify practices to reduce [the
conflict]).”123 Since research shows that most clients don’t understand complex
disclosures anyway,124 it stands to reason that disclosures regarding software
program design and algorithms would be even less comprehensible to retail
consumers, rendering the disclosures moot.125 In addition, while the SEC guidance
is helpful, the scope of these disclosures is left unaddressed. As experts from
Morgan Lewis note, an advisor may use “hundreds” of algorithms, with each having
118. Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers,
supra note 18, at 13-14; Susanna Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure
Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV.
139, 146 (2006) (“In order for a disclosure system to be effective, not only must the
information that is supplied be disclosed completely, clearly, and accurately, but it must also
be read and comprehended by the consumer.”).
119. Guidance Update, supra note 78, at 3.
120. Nicole G. Iannarone, Rethinking Automated Investment Adviser Disclosure, 50 U.
TOL. L. REV. 433, 440 (2019).
121. Guidance Update, supra note 78, at 6.
122. Id.
123. Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers,
supra note 18, at 34-35.
124. Iannarone, supra note 118, at 440 (“Consumers are overwhelmed by the sheer
amount of information disclosed.”). See also Ripken, supra note 116, at 146-47
(“[D]isclosure that is too long or complex to be comprehensible to the average person floods
the individual with too much nonessential data and overloads the person with information that
inhibits optimal decision-making.”).
125. Anita K. Krug, Downstream Securities Regulations, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1589, 1647
(2014) (regulation should be tailored based on the needs of the client).
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its own set of assumptions, risks, limitations, and conflicts.126 Morgan Lewis
contends that it would not be reasonable to provide full disclosures about each, and
that the firm should disclose only what it deems material to making the
recommendation.127
These challenges suggest that the robo-advisor is not a panacea for the ills that
can arise when there is a fiduciary relationship between a client and the advisor. But,
just as humans are capable of acting as a fiduciary, so too can a robo-advisor meet
the fiduciary standard in the right situation. However, current technology suggests
this standard is best met under limited circumstances. First, when the engagement
is limited in scope, such as investment advice, the robo-advisor has design and
monitoring abilities often superior to human capabilities. Second, when the creators
of the advisor are themselves free of conflicts of interest, the robo-advisor offers a
systematic means of delivering conflict-free advice. Finally, the robo-advice must
be delivered with an eye towards clarity and simplicity rather than relying on
disclosures and disclaimers. Specifically, when the nature of the recommendation
is investment-based, the expectation is that the pure robo-advisor can be the client’s
investment advisor within the current regulatory regime. The recent proliferation of
robo-advisors in the securities industry is empirical evidence of the validity of this
proposition.
CAN A ROBO-ADVISOR MEET THE BEST INTEREST STANDARD?
Because the ability of a robo-advisor to meet the fiduciary standard is far from
a settled matter, it would behoove us to consider whether robo-advisors can meet the
new entrant to the liability field, the best interest standard. As we noted above, the
SEC declined to provide a definition for Best Interest, but instead chose a
prescriptive approach which detailed specific actions which, if complied with, would
generally satisfy the Best Interest standard.128 The Reg BI rule has four basic
requirements: a disclosure obligation, care obligation, conflict of interest obligation,
and compliance obligation.129 The compliance obligation requires a broker-dealer
to maintain and enforce policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to
achieve compliance with Reg BI.130 This obligation is largely procedural and we
believe it could be satisfied in a robo-advisor context, so we will not discuss it at
length here.
The disclosure obligation and care obligation are very similar to these duties
under the fiduciary standard. In fact, the SEC has been clear that it drew heavily
126. Steven W. Stone et al., SEC Weighs in on Robo-Advisers: Disclosure, Suitability,
and Compliance Obligations, MORGAN LEWIS (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.morganlewis.
com/pubs/sec-weighs-in-on-robo-advisers-disclosure-suitability-and-compliance-obligations.
127. Id.
128. Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, Release No. 3686031, 83 Fed. Reg. 21574, 54 (June 5, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
129. Id.
130. Id.

2 - DUFFY_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

30

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

12/2/2020 12:43 PM

[Vol. 17:1

from fiduciary principles when drafting Reg BI.131 In our view, the same concerns
exist with a robo-advisor’s ability to satisfy the duty of care and disclosure
obligations under Reg BI as we noted above, but with one important exception.
Recall that at least one expert opined that one of the substantive differences between
Regulation BI and fiduciary duty was that a fiduciary has a duty to provide ongoing
monitoring of a client’s accounts, unless the scope of the client-advisor agreement
was otherwise defined.132 Regulation BI does not require ongoing monitoring. As
we noted above, a robo-advisor would be well-suited to provide ongoing investment
monitoring, even to a greater degree than an advisor. Therefore, a robo-advisor
would likely satisfy the monitoring requirement with no issue because it is already
able to perform monitoring at the fiduciary level.
With regards to the conflict of interest obligation, Reg BI explicitly addresses
the firm conflict issue described above.133 Under this obligation, the broker-dealer
must prevent any material limitations on offerings, such as making
recommendations only for proprietary products, from causing the financial
professional to act in their own best interests.134 This means that broker-dealers can
offer limited or proprietary recommendations, but the advisor cannot personally
receive an incentive for doing so. In other words, the advisor cannot make more
money from recommending a proprietary product compared to a non-proprietary
product.135 Because the firm conflicts are clearly addressed, and personal
motivations are not an issue, we believe robo-advisors can satisfy the conflict of
interest obligation under Reg BI.
STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS
So, where does all of this statutory analysis this leave us? Robo-advisors are
a critical part of the financial advising landscape, and will only continue to grow.
The financial industry needs clarification on when and how robo-advisors will fit in
with, and enhance, the providing of financial advice. As we have shown, roboadvisors meet the best interest standard, and in specific contexts, robo-advisors can
meet the fiduciary standard to an even greater extent than human advisors. Rather
than fight the tide of robo-advising by questioning its ability to mimic human

131. Id. at 1-2.
132. Pierce, supra note 60. (“[O]nly two differences stand out. First, an adviser generally
has an ongoing duty to monitor over the course of its relationship with its client, while a
broker-dealer generally does not. Second, a broker-dealer must either mitigate or eliminate
any material financial conflict of interest it may have with its client.”).
133. Id. (“written policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and disclose
and mitigate, or eliminate, material conflicts of interest arising from financial incentives
associated with such recommendations.”).
134. Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, Release No. 3686031, 83 Fed. Reg. 21574, 15 (June 5, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
135. Id.
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behaviors, we should support the use of robo-advice where and when it outshines its
human colleagues.
We propose a new federal law specific to robo-advisors that highlights and
supports the use of robo-advice in these specific contexts, while prohibiting pure
robo-advice in the areas where its ability to meet the fiduciary standard is less clear.
The statute should identify where robo-advisors are best used and should specify
where human advisors must be utilized. Recall that the strengths of a robo-advisor
are providing investment advice related to a limited-scope engagement, and
continual monitoring and rebalancing of that specific account. Robo-advisors are
then best suited for making portfolio recommendations related to specific assets, and
monitoring, rebalancing and adjusting these accounts as necessary.
For any services that require more than this, a human advisor or a hybrid model
should be required. As we noted above, a robo-advisor’s greatest deficiency in
meeting the fiduciary standard is in proactively gathering data, because if the
questionnaire is ineffective or too limited, the advice is not personalized, and the
robo-advisor cannot utilize human judgement to proactively seek out new
information. For disciplines that require a broad fiduciary scope and information
from dozens of aspects about the client’s life and an ongoing relationship, like
comprehensive financial planning, retirement planning, estate planning, or wealth
management, this lack or insufficiency of information can lead to unfavorable
results. We propose a statutory prohibition on the use of pure robo-advisors in these
contexts. A hybrid model can be utilized in which the robo-advisor performs the
services noted above, but the fact-finding and client relationship management
aspects are managed by the human advisor. Among other ways to effectuate this
policy, the law could be enforced by assigning liability at the firm level for failure
to provide human oversight.
With a statute specifically designed to address the challenges and
advancements posed by robo-advisor platforms, industry professionals and
regulatory bodies will finally get the clarity and guidance that is so desperately
needed.
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